Independent axiomatizability of sets of sentences  by Wojtylak, Piotr
AMals of Pure and Appkd Logic 44 (1989) 259-299 
North-Holiand 
259 
, Bankowa 14, Katowice, Pohd 
Communiated by D. van Dalen 
Received 13 November 1987; revised 27 June 1988 
This is an expository paper on tke problem of independent ippriumatization of 
any set of sentences. This subject was investigated in SO’s and ‘s, and was 
abandoned later on, thu~gh not all fundamental questions were settled then. 
Besides, some papers written at that time are hardly available today and there are 
mistakes and misunderstandings ther would like to get back to that 
unfinished business to clarify the subj matter, correct mistakes and answer 
estions left open by others. We shah deal with results of many authors. 
ever, they will be exposed in a different manner, with complete proofs and, 
often, with refinements and supplements. Some questions will be brought up to 
date and related to other questions in logic. New results and questions will also be 
ed. Stress will be laid on constructive aspects; that is, we will examine the 
problem of the possibility of independent axiomatization as well as algebraic 
means by use of which independent sets of axioms can be given. 
Given a formal theory, one may be interested in simplifying its axiomatization 
and hence, in the first place, one removes (from the 
theory) all formulae which are consequences of the re 
immediately to the notion of logical independence as 
are minimal ones with respect to inclusion and, therefore, no axiom can be 
them. 
agrue that, philosophically, independence is no more or no less 
n consistency and decidability , ndependence was one of the four 
mieant to cm- 
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i&p&nt axiomatizatioriS as being simpler than other sets of axioms, e.g. 
(yoSpIi3 P2# l ’ J is simpler than {po,~~0~\plr~ohp1hp2,. . .} and his hope 
w&d have km that every r.e. (i.e. recursively enumerable) theory has an 
r.e. axiomatization. It is very well known how the other three pillars 
the last 53 years. Independent was neglected, perhaps because the 
of HiBert’s claim for it was too obvious-the independent axiomatiza- 
mated in literature give nothing like intuitive simplicity. go, as matters 
today, the subject of independence is less substantial than the others, 
relatively little formal work hgs ?x+en done in it. 
The topic of independence is also sensible if one looks at the matter purely 
without the assuqtions of broader signifrcancc. There are relatively 
ects in logic so sensitive to the choice of language or cardinal&s of sets, 
or where the choke between classical and intuitionistic rules makes so much 
there are fragments of classical logic which have 
ty for aR sets, while others have so only up tc some 
interesting to discover differences between classical 
and intuition&tic logic in an area where no differences were explicitly introduced. 
The problem of the possibility of independent axiomatization of any set of 
sentences in classical (prop5sitio~~ or predicate) logic was not easy to settle, 
1ogkians tried to resolve it but failed. The first partial solution, for 
countable sets, was obtained by Tarski [WI, 1930. Namely, given a countable set 
{*, 41, @2, l - -1, we obtain an independent axiomatization for it by removing all 
cdadcaly valid sentences from {uO, u~-Q~, ao- (uI-*uz), . . .}. In fact, we 
establish here more than is usually claimed: independent axiomatizabiity by sets 
of sentences built up from {&, ul, u2, . . .} by use of + only. Tarski also showed 
independent axiomatizabiity for any finite set in any (not only classical) logic. 
Further resuits on this subject were more difikult and were achieved much later 
Oil- 
The topic of independence was resurrected by Kreisel [lo], 1957, and by an 
argument due to him and S pecker (see [12], 1962) one can prove independent 
axiomatizability in classic& propositional logic, by use of --) only, of any set of 
sentences of cardinality 4& However, an eznmple by Reznikoff [19], 1966 
the failure at ?Q More spec&aUy, to clear up some misunderstandings, 
Reznikoff sh that in the classical fragment (3) there is a set A of cardinality 
& which is not independently axiom y sets of sentences built up from 
elements of A by means of --, only. Reznikoff also settled (see [18], 
1965) the general problem of indepenkrlt ‘tiomatization in classical logic 
proving ihat any set (in itional or predicate logic) of whatever cardinal&y is 
independently axioma use of the operators --, and A. 
Then, extending p results to the intuitionistic case, Reznikoff Eu)], 
s;bowed that also in the intuitionistic propositional fragment {+, A, v, I) 
has an independent set o wevea, the 
sets has ken left opera settle this 
problem her e proving that, in contrast to the classical case, there are sets of 
cardinal&y Ki which have no independent axiomatization in any fragment of 
intuitionistic lo&. We also correct Reznikoffs claim in 1201 and prove that 
intuitionistic predicate logic does not have independent axiomatizabiity for 
camtable sets, i.e., there are countable sets of sentences which are not 
independently axiomatizable in any fragment of intuitionistic predicate logic. This 
makes Rex&offs positive result astonishingly optimal. 
Reznikoffs argument (in the intuitionistic case) was by reduction of any set of 
sentences, which has no independent axiomatization, to a snake-like sequence 
a0, ~1, a2, . . . such that an-)a,,+l I- a,- for every n. Reformulating this slightly, we 
obtain an algebraic equivalent to the notion of logical independence; independent 
axiomatizability for all countable sets is equivalent to well-foundedness of a 
binary relation 4, where a 4 b me&s b --) a t- 6. This equivalence suits any logic 
comlaining the intuitionistic fragment { +, A} and, using it, we settle the pro 
of independent axiomatization for a large class of intermediate proposi 
log& In particular, 4 is well-founded for all logics with the firfite model propery 
(e.g. the intuitionistic fragment { +, A, v, I}), hence they all :jave independent 
axiomatizabiity for countable sets. The question arises if there are intermediate 
propositional logics without independent axiomatizability for countable sets. We 
leave this question open. 
Moreover, we prove a general theorem on the role of the operators +, A. The 
fragment {+, A} plays a privileged role ;a our considerations, as any independ- 
ently axiomatizable set A is independently axiomatizable by sentences built up 
from elements of A by use of --) and A only. 
The usual proof of independent axiomatizability for coutitable sets is construc- 
tive for (any recursive extension of) classical propositional logic. Thus, one can 
get an independenr recursive axiomatization for any r.e. theory in classical 
propositional lo@. This method does not work, however, if the consequence 
relation is r.e. but not recursive. In contrast, by use of hypersimple sets Kreisel 
[lo], 1957 got an r.e. set which has no independent r.e. axiomatization in classical 
predicate logic. Kreisel also asked whether the system of Peano Arithmetic has an 
independent r.e. axiomatization. The positive answer to this problem was stated 
by Tarski and Vaught [27], 1957 and, in Montague and Tarski [13], 1957, it was 
proved that every reflexive r.e. theory (e.g. Peano Arithmetic and ZF set theory) 
has an independent recursive axiomatization: reflexive theories are those in which 
one can show consistency of acy finite subtheory. Moreover, any finitely 
axiomatizable nnd effectively inseparable theory was proved, by Pour-El [ 161, 
1968, to have an extension which was not indepelrdently r.e. axiomatizable. 
Generally, each EPY. theory which can be constructively shown to be not finitely 
axiomatizable (as well as any finitely axiomatizablc one) has an independent 
recursive axiomatization in Aassical predicate logic. It is not known, however, if 
each recursive theory does. 
The relation between hypersimplicity and recursive independent axi8 
as&al logic, any r.e. 
a clear logical meaning, e.g. Gorbunov 
that the set of all quasi-equations (i.e. Horn 
adently axiomatizable by any of its 
uced iu Section 1. dependent axiomatiza- 
table sets is examined in section 2, which mainly concerns 
deals with uncountable sets and its chiefly devoted 
include there a general result on the role of the 
ritually, Section 4 brings an exposition of results on 
tions on the consequence relation and introduce the 
holds, for every a b and A, B; 
uence of A, and b is valid if it is a 
independent akmatizabiriry 263 
A #b means that b is not a conseque 
denoted by en(A), i.e. b ~Cn(r4) 
equivalent if u t-b and b k-a. Simiiarly, 
A. The axiomatic exterasion f I- by 
are equivalent if A I- 
axiomgtization for 
all reiations I- 
considered here may be regarded as rtain extensions of the intuitionistic 
consequence relation in (4, A}. 
inferences in (3, A ) are also valid for 1: 
e (0) aI_a. 
(i) at-b+a. 
(ii) b, b-,a Ea. 
(%) a+b, b+c)_a-,c. 
(iv) a A Q+c t-a+ (b+c). 
(v) a+bAck(a-*b)A(a+c). 
(vi) (((b+a)+b)+b)+a~((b-,a)~b)-*b. 
The argument is standard. prove (vi) By (i), gets 
-a)+b)+b. reovet, by 
(((b+a)+b)+b)--+a, ((b+a)+b)+bka, 
So, (((b-*a)+b+)-,b)+a, hence, by the (+pror~rty), 
(((b-*a)+b)+b)-*at-b+a. 
Since b-,&r kb by one gets 
(&‘+-+a)+ 
hence (((~~a)-,b)~b)~a~((b-*a)-*b)-*b. Cl 
also have the following result, by iego [3], on sentences up by use of 
3 and A 
. From a finite number of sentences one can build up, by means of + 
and A, only a finite number of non-equivalent sentences. 
owever, if the considered tains other operators than + 
one can build up an infinite t sentences even 
single propositional variable, e.g. the monadic fragment of the intu 
{+, A, v , I}, where _L is a constant and means falsum, is infinite 
2*8). 
(i)+i) above are satisfied by the 
logic and any formulae (including 
tions if )_ does. Smce we 
ndence, it seems to be ns t we foeus our attention 
ns determined by logical systems. However; t- may be 
rators, e.g. it may be the filter relation in 
t-b s blw-hb,+ forsomeb,,...,bsEB, 
lies in logic ( at is, sets h(A)) wrrespond to filters in algebra and 
axiomatic extensions to quotients by filters. 
Set B is said to be independent B\aXa for every a E B. In other words, B is 
dent if it is equivalent to none of its proper subsets. The same set may be 
for one relation t-, but not for another; however, this will not lead to 
logical wnfusion as F will be treated as fixed here. Let & note, 
at any subset of an independent set is also independent and, for 
tistic wnsequence relations, independence is a property of a finite character. 
e set B is independent iff every finite subset of B is independent. 
on the basis of &m’s or Tukey’s lemma, exh independent set can be 
io a maximal independent one. 
ndent axiomatization for A is also a maximal independent subset of 
us, similarly as for other concepts of independence in mathematics 
ear independence in a vector space), one may try to obtain an 
axiomatization for A by ‘free’ extension of any independent subset 
) to a maximal independent one. If maximal independent sets in en(A) 
omatizations for A, then each set would have an independent axiormati- 
em would be settled. owever, this procedure does not 
logic) maximal inde dent subsets of Cn(A) need not 
t k be defined by an intermediate propositional logic and p be a 
t may be easily seen that 
se 
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and contains B. Then A t-p and hence, by finiteness of I-* 
A\B, al-p,. . . , a,#+p t-p 
for some variables Q 1, . . . , a,,. Let a be a new variable. Since p ka-*p, 
A\B, al+p, . . . , a,+p ka-*p. 
This shows that the set A is not independent as al-+pp . . . , a,, +p and a-p are 
distinct elements of B and B is contained in A. 
as been proved above that any superset of B cannot be independent if it is 
an axiomatization for (p}. We conclude that any maximal independent set 
containing B cannot axiomatize (p}. 0 
Since independent axiomatizations are minimal (with respect to inclusion) 
iomatizations, we may try to obtain one, for a give set A, by removing from A 
all ‘dependent’ elements. It is intuitively clear that this procedure works for finite 
sets and a partial solution to the axiomatizabihiy problem has been given by 
Tarski [2!5] 1930: 
to A. 
Any finite set A contains an independent set B which is equivalent 
Suppose that A = {a,, . . . , a,} and let us defme B0 = A and 
B i+l= Bi\ai+l if Bi\ai+l k a,+,, 
B i+l = Bi otherwise. 
Clearly, B, c B,_, 5 - l l E B0 =A and Bi is equivalent o Bi+l for each i. Thus, 
BH is an axiomatization for A. IRt us prove that & is independent. 
Suppose that B,, \ai k ai for some ai. Then Bi- 1 \ai )_ ai as B,, c Bi- 1 and hence, 
by the definition of Bi, we get ai $ Bi which shows that ai $ B,. Thus, it has been 
proved that B, \a, ,F ai for every ai E B,. El 
Let us note that neither 3, nor A, nor even the finiteness of E has been used 
above. Using finiteness, one may prove independent axiomatizability for all 
finitely axiomatizable theories. oreover, the set B may be given effectively if I- 
is recursive. The above method does not work, however, for sets which are not 
finitely axiomatizable. 
3. Let an=poka. A p,, for any natural number n, where P/S are 
ropositional variables. Clearly, {a, : n 20) is independently ax!omatizable but 
no independent axiomatization is included in {a,: n 2 0). Cl 
Since independent axiomatizations can be give 
elements, nor by ‘free’ extensions to maximal ~n~cpende~t sets, 
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l l l A a,} as an independent 
rem 1.4 and is e 
section contains results on independent axiomatizability for countable sets. 
however, is to obtain a manageable algebraic equivalent to 
an equivalent by reformulating 
ff [20] and [22] on independent 
t axiomatizabiity for countable 
ess of a certain binary relation 
independent axiomatizabiity 
for some intermediate logics and some fragmenti of 
ar, we proye that intuitionistic propositional logic 
for all countable sets, while 
n observed by Tarski [Zc] that each countable set of sentences 
L equivalent to an iudependent set. enclose details of that 
ndent axiomatizability and try to apply it to other, non-classical 
every countabk set A there is a set B of sentences built up 
c *t CT_P meam of + only, which is independent in classical logic 
} and let us define: b,, = a0 and b,+I = ao- 
or equivalently bm+r = a0 h l l l A a,+a,,I. Since 
, t%eset {b,:nBO} ise nt to A. 
matization for A if we from i 
{bn: b,, is not valid} and let us prove that 
_I9 b,+l,. . . , b,,, i-fp, 
ao, . . l 9 a,+ an-a,+,, . . . , a,-a, i-a, 
for eve 
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It has been proved that bO, bl, . . l , b,+ b,+l, . . . , b,,, I b, if b,, E 
is finite, we conclude that B\b, X b, for every b, E B. 0 
Thus, any implicative fragment of classical (propositional or predicate) logic 
has independent axiomatizability for all countable sets. The same holds, of 
course, for any finite relation 1 with --, for which Peirce’s law (a + b)+ a t-a is 
valid for every a, b (e.g. all modal ogics with modus ponens rule for material 
implication). Let us prove that the use of Peirce’s law is essential (in the above 
argument): 
Let F be defined by the intuitionistic logic {+} and 
((q+ph.?)-*q and Ql =p 
where p, q are propositional variables. Let us take, similarly as above, 
b,=a,=((q+p)-,q)+q and 
bl =ao-a,= (((q+p)-)q)+q)-*p 
and observe that neither b. nor bl is intuitionistically valid. Thus, b. and bl 
belong to B = {b, : b,, is not valid}. ver, by Lemma l.l(vi), 
and hence bl t- b. which shows that is not independent. 
Not only can it be proved that the set (e,, b,} is not independent, but {bo}, 
which is an independent subset of {ao, al,. . .}? can be shown to have no 
extension to any independent axiomatization for {ao, a,, . . . }. Indeed, if D is an 
axiomatization for {ao, al, . . .} such that a0 E D, then D k al and hence D\ 
ut ao-+al kao by Lemma l.l(vi) and, therefore, we obtain 
means that D is not independent since it has been assumed that 
a0 belongs to D. Cl 
Thus, we get an independent subset of Cn(A) which cannot be independently 
extended to any axiomatization for A. In contrast o the set defined in Example 
1.3, the independent set considered here is finite but the relation k cannot be 
d by classical logic. 
bove suggests, moreover, a certain solution to our problem. 
rve that {al) is an indeFndent axiomatization for {ao, a,) as 
yields al i-a0 by Lemma 1.1(i). wever, al could not belong to any independent 
axiomatization for {ao, al, a,} we had al- a2 t- al since, by the same argument 
as above, (a,} could be proved to ave no independent extension 
atization for {a,,, al, u2} if ul-a2t-al. Then, obviously, {a2} would 
atization for &, al, a,} but, again, a2 could not belong to any inde 
atixation for (ao, al, a2> a,} if a2=+ a3 t- u2. 
a,-+a,+l l-a, for eve 
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at none of the a,‘s is an element of any independent set of 
suggests that such seque , which are said to be 
dent axiomatization at all it is, in fact, a part of a 
says that every countable set of sentences is 
e if there is no Unite smake-like squence. It seems 
a formulation in algebraic terms. 
e snake-like sequence brings to mind 
, a binary relation Q, specifsl its 
result in terms of well-foundedness of 4. 
. aGbiffb+ai-aandakb. 
*al-b. Since b, b-aka by Lemma l.l(ii), we 
reover, a t-b+ a by Lemma 1.1(i), hence a t- 6. 
andakb,thenb+akbandhenceaQb. Cl 
aGbandbGc,thenaGc. 
bGc,tknaGc. 
aGbandbkc,thenaGc. 
prove a more general result: 
(iv) If ax i-a2 and a2 G a3 and a3 I- a4, then a1 G a4. 
at a1 t- a2, a3 i- a4 and a3- a2 k a3 (i.e. a2 4 a3). Since 
a3+a4, a4+iz1, al+a2Fa3+a2 by Lemma l.l(iii), 
get a4- ax t- a3 and hence a4+ a1 k a4 as a3 t- a4. Then a1 Cl a4. 
i) (and (ii)) by identifying a1 with a2 (a, with a4) and (i) follows 
tat-bi!romaGb, seeLemma2.3. 0 
. i-a aGai’ffbGaforeveryb. 
ous as a+ b k a if t-a, and, on the other hand, if a G a, then 
ence f-a as a+a is valid, see Lemma 1.1(O). Cl 
a 4 b and a G c, then a G b A c. 
a 2.3, 
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Since b AC-+~I-~-,(~+V.Z) by Lemma l.l(iv), we also get b AC+ 
aka as c--,&u and b-,uku on the basis of Lemma 2.3. Thus, d-b A c and 
bAc+ul-uwhichshowsthatoab~c. 0 
We conclude that Cl is an ordering relation in the set of non-valid sentences. It
would be helpful, moreover, to identify equivalent sentences, that is to form the 
indenbaum algebra, as a would be then an ordering relation in the Linden- 
baum algebra with the equivalence class of all valid sente s as the greatest 
element with respect o 4. 
In any Heyting algebra, 1 is the greatest element with respect o Cl and 
uab iff b-,u=uanduG9, 
by Lemma 2.3. Unexpectedly, this relation (i.e. the right-hand side o 
equivalence) has been used in literature in connection with free topoi, see Freyd 
[5]; Freyd, Friedman, !k!edrov [4]; Friedman, Skdrov [6]. An element b such 
that u c1 b has been said to be high above the element a (as b is put high above u 
in the diagram of the algebra) and the successor function S has been defined by 
taking the infknum of all objects high above a given object, i.e. s(u) = 
A {b ; u a b}. An ordinal is associated to any complete Heyting algebra by 
iterating S, starting with 0, and taking suprema t limit stages. 
.7. In any Boolean algebra, (b-u)+ b = 6 and hence 
uab iff b=l. 
Thus, Cl collapses and the ordinal of any Boolean algebra is 1. 
Similarly, Cl collapses in classical logic as a Cl b iff kb. 0 
ing algebra, an element b is high above 0 iff b is dense, i.e. 116 = 1 
b = c v -w for some c, see [17]). Since any eyting algebra which is not 
lean contains dense elements different from 1, a collapses only for Boolean 
algebras. The more complicated its relation Q, the more a given algebra differs 
from Poolean ones. 
In logic; if a Cl b then b can be deduced from and there is no hope of 
deducing u from b since b-u implies both a and b. ver, this refers only to 
sentences and it would be misleading if used for formulae with free variables in 
predicate logic. For in me u(x) which is not 
intuitionistically valid, e )]+ P(x) where P is a 
unary predicate letter. Thus, u(x) is high above Vx u(x) though u(x) may be 
deduced from u(x) by the generalization rule. 
on one gener 
presented by formulae built ug 
P. wojfyhk 
2=p, Q~,=P+P and Qti+3=Qas+~Q2n+z and 
ay be easily selp,n that Q4, i.e. lp vp, is high 
over, this is the least element high above Q,; so S(Q,) = Q4. 
we ob^& the sequence: 
s+--Q4n+~~ClQru, 
there is no infinite, descending (i.e. snake-like) sequence 
d the ordinal of the algebra is o + 1. 0 
00, ab a2, . . . is said to be strictly descending for <I iff 
. 
conversely, for each PL, and a is well-founded if for 4 there 1s 
for 
ce. Since <I is anti-3-e xive and transitive i 
mas 2.4 and 2.9, Cl is well-founded if 
(i.e. snake-like) sequence of non-valid 
ess 0f a eans well- 
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foundedness in the set of non-valid se the Lindenbaum algebra). 
The standard, though non-constructive, xt theorem will ue omitted. 
t us recall that an element c E A is 4 inAiffaacfornoaEAand 
note that no valid element a is Cl minimal as a 4 o if a is valid. 
. The relation 4 is well-founded every non-empty set of non-valid 
sentences contains an Cl minimal element. 
Each finite yting algebra is well-founded by 4. Similarly, oolean algebras 
and the Rieger-Nishitnura lattice are we1 Q, see 2.7 and 2. 
may also find algebras where 4 is not w r instance, in any 
Heyting algebra, (I 4 6 iff a < b (for a, b is not well-founded in 
any linear algebra in which < is not well- , e.g. in the algebra obtained by 
adding the bottom to -u. 
Independent axiomutizability and well-foun Mess 
The results by Reznikoff [20] and [22] on independent axiomatizability in 
intuitionist logic may be summarized in the following way: 
. (i) Every countable set is iredepen&mtly axihnaltjztrble iff 4 is 
well-founded (in the set of non-valid sentences), 
(ii) <1 ti well-founded in the intuitioniktic logic (+, A, v, I}. 
The result (i) holds for any finite 1 with --) and A. It holds, in particular, for 
any intermediate (propositional or predicate) logic with + and A. Reznikoff’s 
version of his result was different and his claim that it holds for any calculus 
containing the implicative fragment of intuitionistic logic was correct. It would be, 
however, incorrect here as the use of A is essential for (i)_ A proof of 2.10 will be 
given later. ere, we use 2.10(i) to settle the problem of independent 
axiomatizability for certain logical sIrstems. Well-founde&=ress of 4 is an algebraic 
equivalent for logical independence, and often more manageable since in many 
cases one may easily decide pvhether or not 4 is well-founded. First, let us note 
that 4 is well-founded in thz classical case, see Example 2.7; hence all countable 
classical systems have independent sets of axioms, see reposition 2.1. Somewhat 
less trivial is: 
e Let k be defined over a propositional language and let the set of 
valid formulae be closed l;;rder substitutiota. If all finitely generated sublanguages 
are finite up to equivalence, then a is well-founded. 
S se that ao, al, . . . is desce 
a. p be a propositional variable 
do not occur in a0 y p and denote t
contains no valid 
all variables which 
ce t- is close 
ai, a2, . . . of non-valid sentences. 0 
refers to relations I- determined by propositional systems and 
n found in practice. In particular, by Theorem 1.2 (due to 
in (-*P h) hJs independent Qxiomatiza- 
ent cannot be used, however, to settle the problem of 
ility for intermediate logics in {+, A, v , I). For logics 
r., v, I}, we have a weaker result. Let us recall that the relation I-, 
to have the fmite model property ( 
such that t-a iff a is valid in all al 
. If I- has then 4 is well-founded. 
d , i.e. an- *a,+1 I-a, for every n. 
V in any model for k, i.e. in any 
algebra in which all k valid sentences are valid. It means that 
is a snake-like sequence in any given model for b. If the given 
&rite, it is well-founded by <I and hence h(a,J = 1 for every n. So, the 
finite model for t-. If t- has , then we get l-a, for 
ere is no infinite snake-like sequence of non-valid sentences. 0 
can be proved for any, no necessarily intermediate, logic if we 
is the same. Although 
e is independently axioma 
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znikoffs argument was more complicated, we include it belo n a similar 
way as above one cou atizability for all 
logics, the linear talc tnam logic and many 
others. The question arises if there are intermediate logics without independent 
axiomatizability for all countable sets. The same question arises for fragments of 
intuitionistic logic resulting by the addition of new operators to {+, A, v , -L} , 
e.g. those definable by infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions. leave both 
questions open. 
The above discussion does not concern, however, predicate logics. Actually, 
Reznikoff has claimed in [20] that his positive result covers also to the 
intuitionistic predicate calculus, but it was a mistake as: 
. There is a countable set of sentences which is not independentlY 
axiom&able in the intuitionistic predicate logic. 
Let a = Vx {[P(x) 3 P(f (x))] --, P(x)) where p is a predicate letter and f 
is a functional letter. Moreover, let a, = a -3 P(f “(r)) where r is a constant and f 
is the iteration of f (n times). By the definition of a, we get a, P(f”(t)) + 
P(f”+*(r)) k P(f”(r)) and hence 
(a-+ WV))-) (a+ P(f n+Ywt a b WYr)) 
which shows that a,, --3 a,+l k a,, for every n. To show that the formulae a,, are not 
intuitionistically valid let us consider a model on the set of natural numbers 
0, 1,2, . . . with f(n) = n -I- 1, where P(n) takes the value -n in the infinite linear 
yting algebra given by adding the bottom to -0. Then (P(n)+ P(n + 1)) + 
P(n) is valid in the given interpretation for each nd hence the formula a, i.e. 
Wx {[P(x)-* P(f (x))]+ P(x)}, is valid there, too ever, P(f”(r)) is not valid 
for any r which shows that a* P(f”(r)), that is an, is not valid, either. Thus, we 
obtain au infinite snake-like sequence of non-valid sentences in predicate 
logic. Cl 
The same holds for any intermediate logic in which the formulae a,, are not 
valid. Moreover, one can easily translate the above example into predicate 
languages without functional etters and constants. Namely, let 
an = 6, A b’, A b3 A b,-*Vx,- l ax,, [A(x,) A F(x,, x,) 
A* l l A F(xn-1, x,)--f’ P(xn)] 
where 
bl = [A(X)---* [A(Y)-+W, Y)ll A Y F(x, Y), 
b2 = [F(& Y) A (P(x)-+ P(Y )) -+ P(X)]? 
b3= zw [1(x, y) A Qx, z) A F(y, w)-“I(z, w)], 
bq= KG Y) A P(x)-) P(Y)], 
F, A represent the identity rela 
ly. Similarly as above, &T,- Qati !- 
algebra of any formal theory in classi 
dicate logic and 2F set 
nistic logic, the situation 
algebras for certain 
d by Freyd, Freedman, &edrov [4] 
ion (e.g. the second-order logic, 
to the algebras of 
mprehension (e.g. the propitional or predicate logic). We 
mentioned result in [4] Namely, 
algebra of the intuitktitic propositional logic is 
not isomorphic;0 that of the predicate logic (as one is well-founded by 4 while the 
is not). 
bY gebra determines an intermediate (propositional and predicate) 
h%J ‘C. g arguments for 2.11 and 2.15, it could be proved that: the 
predicate i@ic has irrdependent ax&natizability for all countable sets iff 4 is 
in the whok algebra, while the propositional Frrgment has the 
wiomatirability if only each finitely generated subalgebra is weiri- 
r instance, all finitely generated subalgebras of any linear 
bra are finite, and hence well-founded, while the whole algebra need 
unded. Thus, the linear calculus of Dummett has the independent 
reas the corresponding predicate logi does not. If we get an 
without independent axiomatizability, we also get a Gnitely 
generated algebra in which 4 is not well-founded. Note that all free Heyting 
algebm on finite sets of generators are well-founded by 4 (see 2.10). 
Proof of the in 8Vsult 
ent for Theorem 2.X!(i) is quite similar to the original one by 
[20]; it is based on three additional lemmas. 
endent, then each sentence a, A l l l A ai+ai+l, i 2 0, 
by means of -3 and A is 4-minimal in G(B) (i.e. in 
set of consequences of B) unless it is valid. 
that B is independent and b E B. Let us prove that b is a 
), i.e. c Cl b does not held for any c E Q(B). 
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ach element of an in 
hsequences (of t 
2nd CU{~A&} aze i 
elements of an indepe 
each non-valid sentence 
belongs to an independ 
en(B). 0 
has been shown to be Gminimal in the set 
reover, let us observe that C bl {B, b --, b,} 
nt to I3 if b and bI are distinct 
, b,}. Thus, if l3 is independent, 
up from elements of B by means of + and A 
B and hence is 4 minimal in 
The above holds for with --); neither finiteness of F, nor A is essential 
above. We will use 7 to prove that any i&&e strictly descending (fc;r 
a) sequence is not ntly zziomatizable. 
Let us get back, for a e, to Example 2.2 where it has been shown that there 
are independent subsets (A) which cannot be extended to any independent 
set of axioms for A. The ve lemma explains that a subset of @n(A) should not 
only be independent but uld contain soiely 4-minimal elements (in Cn(A)) if 
we want it to have n to an :ndependent axiomatization for A. 
2.18. Let A be untable and not finitely axiomatizable. Then A is 
independently axi&nat8za if and only if for every a E Cn(A) there is wa element 
c E Cn(A) such that a + CLminimal in Cn(A). 
Let B = {b,, bl, . . m }, where bi + bi for i # j, be an independent axioma- 
tization for A and let A ka. Since I- is finite, bO, . . . , 6, t-a for some n. Let us 
prove that a+ bn+l is a-minimal in Cn(A). 
Obviously, a + b,+I belongs to Cn(A). Suppose that x 4a --, 6,+1 for some x .in 
Cn(A). Since bO A l l l A h, I- a, one gets (see Lemma I. l&i)): 
a+b,,+Ikbon l l l n b,,-,b,,, 
and hencex~bO~~=~nb,-,b,+l by transitivity of 4, i.e. Lemma 24iii). It 
means, however, that bO A l 0 l A b,+ b,,, is not Gminimal in Cn(A). But 
b 9 b,, b,+, are distinct elements of an independent set B, which is 
eluivalent to A, and hence (by Lemma 2.17) bO A l l l A b,+ b,+l should be 
a-minimal in Cn(A). Thus, we get a contradiction. 
.} and let us define, inductively, an independent 
axiomatization {bO, bl, . . . } for A in the following way 
bo=aOAcO and b,=b,n=*~Ab,_,-,c,ha, 
where cm is such an element hat bO A l l l A b,_p c,, is 4-m 
Since b,, is a consequence of A and bO, . . . , 6, t-u,, for each IL, the set 
; let us prove its independence. 
at bO, . . . , b,+ b,+a,. . . , b,t-6, for so 
b 0,. l l ? b n-1, bn+cn Aan, l . 9 9 6, -+ cm A Q, I- 6, and hence 
S . 
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, descending sequence 
tion for {a*, al, . . .}. 
, however, contradicts our 
of its members are valid. Let b be 
conclude, by Lemma 2.17, that B is 
4 be well-founded and A count could use Theorem 1.4 if A were 
atizable. Then, by Lemma 
is an element c in Cn(A) 
, there is an element 
are non-valid sentences in the set 
.9, each non-empty set of non-valid 
-4S&IhiUUlh 
c)+bI-a+c and 
wever, it would mean that u-b 4 u+ c 
c was 4hninimd in {u+b: b &n(A)}. 
that for every a E Cn(A) there is an element 
-minimal in Ca(A). It means, according to Lemma 
rs a more general question than Theorem 2.10(i), 
omatizable sets without assuming that 4 is 
is independently axiomatiz- 
) for every Unite subset X of 
on <lx is determined by the 
Independent axiomatizability m 
be found ctively for each a. to that question in Section 3. 
n contrast o mma 2.18, the argumen eorem 2.10(i) given above is not 
constructive as we have used there eorem 2.9 which cannot be proved 
constructively. 
Let A = {aO, al, . . . } and suppose that a,,+l ka, for every n, i.e. {a,}, is 
descending for l-. Lemma 2.18, A is dently axiomatizable if for every n 
there is an m s al in Cn(A). Then we get 
in ndent axiom sng: a,,, anO+ a,,, am,+ amz, . . . where nk+l 
is e least m such in Cn(A) and ‘~n~ is the first 
<I-minimal element in A: cf. 
The above results have been proved under the assumption that l- is finite wit 
--+ and A. Similar results could be shown for relations k without A ; however, the 
whole problem would be more complicated then. 
Independent axiomatizability in fragments 
The next lemma is crucial in Reznikoff’s argument for 2.lO(ii), i.e. independent 
axiomatizability for all countable sets in the intuitionistic logic {+, A, v, I} (let 
us remind that we have already proved it by a simple algebraic argument, see 
Corollary 2.13). 
Let CIS(A), for any given set A ia { +, A, v, I} be the set of all conjunctions 
of formulae: 
where al, . . . , a,, r are subformulae of formulae in A. n the intuition&tic Jqgic 
{+, A, v, I), one can prove the following: 
v X, a- b 1 I’, where X are subformulae in A and a, r E CIS(A), 
then there is b formula c E CIS(A) such that 
X,a+cW and bkc. 
The proof is by induction cn the length of a Gentzen proof for X, 
a+ b k E If r is a variable and belongs to X or if the constant I belongs to X, 
we take c =p +p for any variable p occurring in A. Sup &at X, a--p&‘:-r 
as been obtained at the k + 1-th step from axiomatic uents by means of 
Gentzen rules, i.e. X, a-b t-k+1 I+, and let us assume that our lemma h4Qs for 
everyx, a, b, rif X, o-,bt-kr 
a subformula in 
, there are formulae cl and c2 
c=c1/4c2 and ob 
u-aclkzandbI-cl. S 
entaully, we obtain 
ur argument in the 
el-rand bk. 
takec=c,Ac2anAgetA,a+cWbytheuseof 
(VI). X,a-,b, d)‘ArandX,a-*b, ekkrforsomedveEX. 
en there are formulae c1 and c2 in CIS(A) such that X, u-cl, d k r and 
X,43c2, eland bkclnc2. We take c=c1~c2 and get X,a+cWby the 
(IV). X,a+bt-kdorX,a_*bkkeforr=dve. 
a formula c in CIS(A) such that bl-c and X,a+c)_d or 
get X, a+cWby the use of (rv). Cl 
ation for 4: if b 4 Q (i.e. a- b I- a), then there is a 
laeofabyuseof-*and~suchthatbt-cand 
reover, the formula c may be given effectively and its construction does 
e same holds for predicate logic as well, there is, however, 
between the propositional and predicate case. Namely, 
tional formula has only finitely many subformulae and therefore 
a finite number of interpolants c for any b Q a. This is not satisfied 
logic (even without functional symbols) and hence there are 
intuitionistic predicate logic that have no independent 
ition 2.15 and the following: 
there is no infinite descending sequence (for Q) 
ClOgiC{+,A,V, I}. 
a 2.19, we get cl in CIS(b,) sue 
b2 4 bl, we ako get b2 <lcl by transitivity of 0; see 
SW= 2.19 
2kc2 a the 
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above procedure, we obtain the following sequence: 
b0 D cl D c2 D c3 D l l l 
and all c’s are conjunctions of fo 
al, . . . , Go, r are SubformuYae in bO. 
the above sequence contains only finitely many non-equivalent 
over, any sequence descending for Q is also descending for I- (see 
mma 2.3) and hence c,, C-C,+~ for some n. Then c, is valid as c&+1 <I c, (i.e. 
Ga-Cn+l i-en) and consequently b0 :Is valid, too. conclude, therefore, that 
there is no infinite, descending sequence for 4 of eon-valid sentences in 
1% A, v, I)- 0 
The above shows independent axiomatizability, for all countable sets, in each 
fragment of { +, A, v, 1) which includes + and A. The same problem for 
fragments without A is left open. We are only able to get a positive answer to our 
problem for the fragment {+}: 
Each countable set A in the intuititHstic k&c { r3 , A, v, I} is 
independently axknatiztible by se& of formulae built up ftom subformulae in A by 
use of --, only. 
Suppose that A = {a,, al,. . .} and let X, be the set of consequences of A 
which are built up from subformuEae in {aO, . . . . Q~} by use of + only. 
According to Theorem 1.2, the set X, is finite (up to equivalence) and 
U {&: n 2 0) is equivalent o A (since a,, belongs to X,, for each PZ). 
By Theorem 1.4, one can find a subset Y, of & which is independent and 
equivalent to X, relative to X,_, . That is, Y, is contained in X,, the set X,_, U Yn 
is equivalent to X, and X,,, , Y,, \a X a for every a 8 Ye. 
Then, let us define B,,, for every n, in the folloting way: if B,_, = 
{b 1;. . . , &J, we take B, = B,_l U {bl+(b2q (. . .@,+a) l l l ): a E Y,}. If 
B,_l is empty (which is the case e.g. when n = 0), we take S, = U,. 
It is clear that Bn_, is contained in B, and BR is equivalent o Xm (since 
X,_, U Y, is equivalent to Xn). Moreover, elements in are built up from 
subformulae in {aO, . . . , a,,) by use of --) only. e our argument it 
suffices to show that B,, is independent for each n, :n~O}willbethe 
set of axioms for A we are looking for. 
Since Y, has been assumed to be independent relative to X, +, it is enough to 
show that B, \ bi X bi for each bi E B,, -1. Let us suppore that B, \b, b bj for some 
& E B,,_,. Then, by the definition of B,, one gets 
Bn-,\bj, (bi-, a: a E Y,} I- 63 
and, on the basis of Lemma 2.19, one can replace the Q’S by consequences of A 
ich are in CIS( _-1). Since the formulae in C conjunctions of 
P. 
ndent axiomatization in fragments without --+ is left 
there are fragments which 
countable sets. An example was 
that {cm: it HI} has no independent set of axioms in the 
eat of classical logic. 
section deals with uncountable sets of sentences and merely concerns 
independent axiomatixability in fragments of classical logic. In the classical case, 
any set of se of whatever cardinal@, is independently axiomatizable by 
useof+and/\ e Rex&o& 1181. In addition to that we prove independent 
axiomatizability up to NI by use e F --, result by Kreisel and Specker in 
[12], and show the failure of this tit prove that intuitionistic logic has 
dent axiomatizability only up to & and discuss the role of the operators 
in our problem. 
ical logic 
be a set of senten= of whatever cardinal@. We prove that A is 
axiomatizable if it has an independent axiom set D on the ground 
of an axiomatic extension kc of I- with card(C) s card(D). This holds for any )_ 
th A; I- need not be finite, nor implicative. 
there are two sets C and D such thszt 
independent set of axioms. 
axiomatizes A (by (1)) and is independent (by (2)). 
y (3), we can 
reover, b, f bs if Q! 
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= {a* A 6,: a! 
equivalent o A by (1). 
C, D \6, C- 6, which contr 
is equivalent o C U D. So, 
at-a0 n b, for some ar<p. Then 
is independent. 0 
In contrast, to prove the result of znikoff [Ml, the relation F should be 
defined by classical (propositional or ) logic over a language with + and 
A; sentences are built up from s bols (i.e. variables, predicate 
letters, etc.) in the usual way. 
. Any set of sentences, of whatever cardinal@ is independently 
axiomatizable in classical logic. 
Suppose that A is not countably axiomatizable (otherwise see 
2.1) and let us define, by induction on ordinal numbers: 
V, - a finite set of symbols in A, disjoint with VP for any 19 < a, 
b, - an element of A, with its symbols in U {VP: /3 s ac}, such that & ,& b, 
where A, is the set of consequences of A built up from U {VP: j3 c cu). 
Suppose that I$ and b, have been defined for each @ c a and assume that A, 
does not axiomatize A, i.e. A,Xb for some 6 in A. Then, we take: 
b,=b and Vm=V(b)\U{V,:/9<cu}, 
where V(6) is the set of the specific symbols in 6 (in the propositional logic V(6) 
contains the propositional variables in 6). It is obvious that A,Xb, and V, is 
finite, disjoint with any VP for /3 < QC. oreover, 6P # 6, for fi < LY as 6@ is in A, 
and A,,++,. 
If A, axiomatizes A, our construction terminates and, then, we use Lemma 3.1 
to complete our argument. Thus, let us assume we have V’ and 6, for every 
a! < p and A, axiomatizes A. It has to happen for some p as b, # bfl if LY # /3. 
Since any sentence c contains only a finite number of symbols and the sets 
{IQ or < p} are disjoint, V, n V(c) is not empty only for a finite number of 
ordinals dy, Let C be the set of sentences: 
A {b*: v, n V(c) # }-*c, for all c EAP; 
and let us define D to be the set of sentences: 
A {6@: VP n V(b,) # 0 and /3 < cu} -+ b,, for all a < p. 
Proof of (1). All elements of C U D are consequences of A. oreover, one can 
show, by induction on cw, that D )_ b, for ev 
C, each element in A, is a consequence of
conclude that C U is also an axiomatization for A. 
of of (2). Let C, \bMforsomebE 
P. 
for some cu<p and some q,..., a,, in CUD which do not have b, in the 
uent (as they are different from b). Since (bo+ c) b,, we can also 
at none of the ai’s contains b, in the antecedent 
{bg Vs n V(b,) # andCp<cu),q,...,c,f-b, 
. . . , c, in Ap such that V(c,, . . . , c,) n V, = reover, V(b@) n 
d hence, by int lation, 
in V(b,)\ V,. 
A t-x and x )_ ba for some x buil,f up 
me b, is built up from U {V& igs cu}, we 
Q k-b, which is, however, impossible. 
have card(D) = card(b,: cy < cc) = card(p) as b, #b, if 
Qy P is built up from U {V,: cu< p} and each G’, is finite, hence 
card(A,)S&- card(p). If p were finite, then A would have a countable 
axiom on which is incompatible with our assumptions. So, card(p) is infinite 
hence cxud(A,) ~card(y). Since C is a subset of A,, we conclude that 
card(C) s card(p) = cad(D). Cl 
ult concerns any @n&y) fragment of classical logic with + and 
is essential as we have referred above to Lemma 3.1 for which 
We have also used here finiteness of F, the operator +, 
erce’s law and, which is less important, the axiom of choice. 
e above argument strongly requires F being defined by classical logic and 
the question arises if independent axiomatizability extends to other logics, e.g. 
intuitionistic one. 
y extending his result for classical logic, Reznikoff [20] has shown that 
set of sentences in intuitionistic logic is independently axiomatiz- 
discussed this result in the preceding section). The same question for 
uncountable sets has been left open by him. We settle this problem here. The 
answer to this question is, however, negative even for sets of cardinality HI. 
given below is fairly general, it extends to many other 
is in sharp contrast to Reznikoffs result for c%assical 
sitive result for countable sets astonishingly optimal. 
. There are s?ts of cardinal&y K1 which are not independently 
able in intuition&ic logic. 
sitional variable for a! c HI and let 
. 
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shows that 
d above. Apart from 
suffices only to replace the 
‘s are unary predicate letters. Since A0 UA1 has 
may claim that it is not 
of intuitionistic logic. 
set of sentences in classical logic. oreover, the above 
intermediate logics for which A&p,, e.g. the calculus of 
en, let us get back to classical logic. One may ask if the operator A is 
for independent axiomatizabiity in the classical case. The first result in 
on independent axiomatizability of uncountable sets, by Kreisel and 
in [12], concerned independent axiomatizability up to PC1 in the classical 
al logic {+}. 
In &s&al propositional logic: any set A of cardinality SK, is 
able by sets of formulae built up from elementi of A by 
th p < ar, which are not consequences 
s: if I is the set 
alscu<&forwhic and G, are equivalent, then sup I -= HI, i.e. fislr 
te, all elements 0 
,2 & is an independent 
m elements of by mea= of + only, and 
axiomatization for A we are 
as been defined for each /3 E I 
will always denote an element of I) and let us prove that one 
Let A, = {a,,, al, . . . } and let V, be the set of variables p,, occurring in 
{ a0, . . . t a,,} such that y G J? for some ig C 1y (and j3 E I). Since any formula is 
built up from a finite number of variables, V, is finite. Thus, there is an /? c CIC 
such that-y G /3 for every p,, E V,. It means that all consequences of A built up 
from variables in V, belong to a Gs, i.e. are consequences of A, (since j3 E I). 
one can build up only a finite number of non-equivalent formulae from the 
variables in V,. ence one can correlate, with each number II, a finite set X, in 
A, (for some /I < cu) such that X, l-x for every x which is a consequence ofA built 
up from the variables in V,. 
Let 
where {x1, . . . , x,} =X,, or equivalently bn=/\X,AaoAal~===ha~_,-*an. 
We get B, by adding to U {BP; ji? < a} all b/s which are not valid. It is obvious 
that B, axiomatizes A,: if ao, . . . , a,,_1 are consequences of B,, then so is a,, as it 
is a consequence of ao, . . . , a n_l, X,, b,, and, moreover, all elements in X, are 
consequences of U {Be : /3 < a}. It remains to prove that the set B, is 
independent. 
If B,\b,,t-b,,, then lJ{Bp: /3< a}, ao, . . . , a,,+, a,,+a,,,l, a,,--,a,+2,. . . t-a,, 
and hence U {BP: /3 C cy}, ao, . . . , a,+ l-a,. Then, by interpolation, 
U{B&3<a}i-x and n,ao,...,a,-lka,, 
for some x built up from the variables in V,. She x is a consequence of A, we 
also get X, lx. It means that b, is valid and hence b, $ Bm. 
Suppose that U {BP: j? < cu} \b, bo, . . . , b,, i-b for some b in U (BB: /3 c cu}. 
ThenU{Bp$<ar}\b,ao,..., a, k b and hence, by interpolation, 
U{B&3<~}\b,xkb and ao,. . . ,a,bx 
for some formula x built up from the variables in V,. Since t-n, we 
get x + a,, k b, by the definition of b, and hence b, +x k x. Since 
$<ar}\b, bo,. . .,bJ-x, we get < cu}\b, bo, . . . , b,_l i-x 
:jB<a)\b, bo,...,b,-l 
which is impossible as U { 
of independent axi 
2.1 for countable s 
P. wojtykiak 
lo@ {+} tk?e is a set 
kk by sets of 
card(&) s K1 and 
a variable (with #3 > X1) virhich does not occur in B1 and let 
= {i C KI: P)i*pp F b COG some b E B}. 
a formula in {*}, ‘&en x l-b for some variable x. Since a!l formulae in B 
up from elements of A by means of *, for every b E i3 there is an a E A 
at a k b. Thus, the following subset of A: 
{pi+pj: i C j C Xl} U { pi~p,:iCK,Ca#~)U{pi-+p~:iEI} 
Let us prove this cannot be true if sup I C K1. Indeed, 
value T (Truth) to each pi with i > sup I but pp, and assigning the 
aluation which satisfies 
sup I < i < N1. Thus, it 
} be an infinite subset of I. Then, there 
ables pill and pB must 
we would get l-b, which is impossible as b, E B and B is 
b”‘s belongs to B1. 
} iS infinite as pi, Occurs in b, and each formula contains 
t uncountable o number, sup{i,) C K1. 
for every ra. 
sequence i’ a finite 
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y a similar argument one can also e that {pa+ps:tyC/j<&) and 
{pP-pa: LY < /3 < &) have no independent axiomatizations by use of + only. It 
does not mean, however, that the classical fragment {+) does not have 
independent axiomatizability at k&, we leave this question open. That is, it is still 
open if there are sets in {+) which are not independently axiomatizable in {+), 
i.e. by sets of formulae built up from propositional variables by use of + only. As 
concerns the set A in 
. The set A conside above has an independent axiomatization i  
{+), i.e. A can be shown to be independently axiomatizable by sets of formr;lae 
built up fkom propositional variables by means of 3 only. 
Let A~~{p~~p~~O~i~j~X~)U{p~-+p,:OCi~K~<~) and let AZ= 
{P o+pe; for all cy < Hz). It is clear that the variable p. does not occur in AI and 
Al U A2 = A. Since any set in (3) is independently axiomatizable in {+, A) (see 
Theorem 3.2), let be an independent set in {+, A) whkh is equivalent to AI. 
We can assume that p. does not occur in B (it will be further shown, see Theorem 
3.7, that B can be even built up from elements of Al by means of-+ and A only). 
Suppose that B” = (b VP,: b E B). It can be easily shown that B” is independ- 
ent (as B is independent and the variable p. does not occur in B) and equivalent 
toAf={avp o : Q E A). Since b v p. is equivalent in classical logic to (b 3 po) - 
p. and b is a conjunction of formulae in {+), we conclude that b vpo is 
equivalent o a formula in {+). One could use here a general result on classical 
logic; namely, a propositional formula a is definable in {+) iff p I- a for some 
variable p (the implication (+) can be easily shown for any formula a in a 
conjunctive normal form). Clearly, go k b v p. for every b. Thus; B” U A2 may be 
regarded as a set of formulae in {+). Let us prove it is independent and 
equivalent to A. 
All elements in B” U A2 are, of course, couzquences of A. To prove B”, A2 C-A 
it suffices to show B”, A2 l-Al. Since B” is equivalent to A!, 
B°Fpi-*pjvpo forO<i<j<& 
and 
B”kpi+ppVpo forO<i<K,<ar. 
Then, using po*pj and po-+pa, which belong to Aa, we obtain: 
B”, A2 kpi+pj for i <j < K1 and B”, A2 kpi+par for i < rCl< CY. 
It means that B”, A2 t-A, and hence B” U A2 is equivalent to A. 
Suppose that B”, A2\a ka for some Q E AZ. Then we get 
B09 Pr+P,,, PO-+P~*9 l l l 9 Po+Pcuk t-Po-*PLQ+, 
where cyl, cy2, . . . , a&+1 are distinct ordinals 44,. Replacing po by any valid 
ula we would get then pa,, . . . , pak t-pak+, whi 
P. Woj6ykbk 
that alvpO,..., a,, v po, A2 l-~r,+~ v per for some distinct elements 
by mj refutable rmula we would 
impossible as has been assume 
UA2 is independent. 0 
an independent 
elements of A 
atization in {+} but not by sets of 
. 
enough to build up an independent axiomatiza- 
set of sentences in {A}, e.g. no independent axiomatization for 
can be built up by means of A only. Qne may 
hokls for {+, A}; that is if there are sets which 
ntly axiomatizable by use of more operators but which are not 
xiomatkab!e by use of + and A only. It turns out, however, that 
. If A is in&pen&dy axkwtizabk, then it is independently 
by ~entenceis of thefom: 
g1 A ..-hgr-h/\hlw-.Ahs, 
gl,..., g,, k hn l . l , h, E A (the case t = 0 or/and s = 0 is possible). 
Let B be an independent axiomatization for A. We will replace, step by 
step, members of B by (&rite) conjunctions of sentences in A. Thus, at each step 
ar, a &rite set B, will be deleted from B and a new element h,, a coiljunction of 
sentences in A, will k introduced in its plxe. The introduced element wiil be a 
ence of the deleted ones and, on the other hand, all sentences in B, will 
i.e. the element introduced at the next step. Then 
will be an axiomatization for A and an independent axiom system 
n by taking h,, A l l l A h,,+h, as b, for some 
Let us define a,, b,, h, and b, by tran&nite induction. Ordinals 
as usual, the steps of construction. Suppose that us, BP._ hs bP have 
n def&ed for /3 < m. Sir& A and are equivalent, for every finite X s B one 
can find h,, a conjunction of senten in A, such that h, i-X. On the other hand, 
get & I-h, for some finite B, 
any element of B\U { 
(2) 2 be a conjunction of sentences in A such that 
k&a,, hat- if &=/34, 
h,t-B\lJ{B&#cau} ifBUJ{B&?<ar} isfinite; 
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Since B, is finite and a, # as if /3 < cu, by (1) (3), the set (pi 
finite, too. If t =0, we ~5 b, = h,. Let observe that our 
terminates when B\U ( 
Recursiveness. OUT , this means that aa, B,, h,, b, are 
effectively given for the assumptions of auf result are 
constructively. Thus, assuming that B and A are r.e. sets and k is r.e., 
ain an independent r.e. axiomatization for A. 
Indeed, if B is finite and effectively given, one can find sentences 
g&,-.*9 g,czA such that g,g,, . . . , g, I- B. It is clear that the one-element set 
1gAglh l l l A gs} is an independent r.e. axiomatization for A. 
Suppose that B is infinite. Then B\U (BP: p c cu} is not empty and, since $1 
BP’s are finite and effectively given, -le can easily decide whether or not a given 
element of B is or is not in U ( Bfl: #? < a}. Thus, a, can be effectively found for 
any cu<o. 
The element h, cm also be given effectively. One can generate simultaneously 
elements of A and sequents for I-. Since A I- a, and A k Ba+, one can find 
g, g1, l ’ l 9 g,EA such thatg,g, ,..., g,)_a, andg,gi ,..., gJ-P,+ Then we 
takeh,=ghglh---Ag,. 
If one gets h,, one can also find B,; b, may be defined in the same way as 
above (or one could take ho A l l l A h,+-, h, as b,). 
Axiomatizability. Since, by (1) and (3), Q, # us for fi < Q! our construction 
must terminate. Since it terminates only when B = c) (BP: /3 < p) for some p, we 
conclude that each element of B belongs to some BP. 
Let us prove that {hs: Cp < cc} is equivalent to B. Clearly, B k h, for each Q( as B 
is an axiomatization for A and h, is a conjunction of sentences in A. To prove 
( hs: /? < p} t- B means to prove ( hs: /3 < p} t- B, for each (Y, Let us observe that 
hp+l t- B, by (2). So, it remains to show (hs: B < p} k B, when h,+l does not 
exist, i.e. when B = U(Bs: @ < QI + 1) (when p = D + 1). However, if this is the 
case, then B\U (BP: /!I < a} is a finite subset of B, and hence each element of 
B\U (BP: #9 < a} is a consequence of h,. Since h,,, t-BP for #3 c a, we also get 
(h&?sa}kB. 
Our main task, however, is to prove that (bq: Q! C pj is equivalent o A. Of 
course, it suffices to show t3at (h,: cy < p j and (b*: Q! c p} are equivalent. It is 
obvious that h, t- b,. To prove (ba: /3 < ar) l-h, for every cu, we use a routine 
induction on CY. We get (h,: B < (Y j, b, I- h, by the definition of b, and hence 
(bs: /3 s cy j k h, by the inductive hypothesis. 
Independence. Each B, is a finite subset of B and, acco ing to (i), it does not 
contain any as with /3 > (Y. Thus, one can assume that 
B, = (up,, . . . , apI, .xls . . . p .w,} 
where& ,..., IS,<aandx* ,..., x,areelementsof B\(q&faj. 
Since B, t-h, by (3) and, by (2), hs F us for every /.I < (v, we also get 
h,,, . . . A,+,, . . . ,x,(-h, 
and hencex,, . . , , x, t- b, by (4) which proves \a0 I- b, for every /3 + 1y. 
P. Wojtylak 
at for some j3. Since l is equivalent to 
is independent 
{b,: a+j3}Xbs for every /3- Cl 
tion of methods and results on independent 
vely enumerable) set of sentences. By 
ssible to get r.e. sets which have no independent 
ence relation is r.e. but not recursive), cf. 
n between the notion of hypersimple and 
recursive axiomatization k clasciti logic, see Pour-El [ 161. Then, 
tionistic case and prove, following 
[21], that there are r.e. sets in the intui&uGstic fragment {-, A, v, I} 
have no independent r.e. axiomatization. 
t A = {ao, al, a2, . . .} be an r.e. set of sentences and let us assume that the 
ence relation k is r.e. The main problem is whether A has an 
r.e. axiom system. The step from r.e. axiomatizations to recursive 
ons is not problematic; Turing [28], Craig [l]. Indeed, taking 
_l+a,) - l 0) we obtain a recursive set {b,, bl, b2, . . .} 
e can also get a re axiomatization for A by use of A 
g b,=a,w-A S. Since { bo, bl , b2, . . . } is inde- 
ent if A is independent, one gets 
. If A has an independent r.e. axiomatizatin, then A also has an 
recumive axiomatization. 
case of r.e. sets, we have the following consequence of 
role of the operators + and A: 
r.e. axiom&able (by use of more 
&able by we of -3, A. 
to usual f of independent axiomatizabili 
cla case. get an independent axiom system fo 
Gi:, ao* al, a2 + (aI+ ao), . . .) all classical tautologies. Since 
~4x1 set is recursive if k is recursive, one gets 
endent r.e. axiomatization i
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same holds for any recursive extension of the prepositional ogic. 
n if the consequence relation is r.e. but not recursive, e.g. 
e above argument does not hold either for the 
intuitionistic (propositional or predicate) logic, as the given axiomatixation could 
not be independent there: see Example 2.2. A general solution to our problem 
can be given by use of Lemma 2.18. Let us recall that we have proved Lemma 
2.18 by means of constructive methods, hence taking c, =f(a,) for a recursive 
mapping f, one gets: 
Let A be r.e. and not finitely axiomatizable. Then A has an 
independent i.e. axiomatization i! there is a recursive procedure f such that 
A k f (a) and a-f (a) is Gminimal in en(A) for every a E en(A). 
In classical ogic, each element in Cn(A) is ~-minimal unless it is valid, see 
Example 2.7. Thus, we get the following theorem, which may also be found in 
Kreisel [ 101, rviontague and ‘I’arski [l3] and P’ur-El[l6]: 
S. Let A be r.e. and not finitely axiomatizable in ckssical predicate 
logic. Then A has an independent r.e. axiomatization (in classical logic) iff there is 
a recursive procedure f such that A I-f (a) and a X f (a) for every a E en(A). 
In other words, A has an independent r.e. axiomatization if A can be shown 
constructively to be not finitely axiomatizable (obviously 5nitely axiomatizable 
theories are independently r.e. axiomatixable, too). 
se1 [lo] showed that a recursive set of sentences need not have an 
in ndent recursive axiomatization. e also asked if the system PA of 
Arithmetic does. The (positive) answer to this ion was announced in 1271 by 
Tarski and Vaught, and in the paper [13] by ntague and Tarski there was 
given the following more general result: 
. Any refIexive classical theory has an independent r.e. 
axiomatization. 
y a theory we mean any set T such that T = Cn(T) T is said to be 
xive iff, in T, one can prove the consistency of every ly axiomatizable 
subtheory of T. at is, T is reflexive if T U {Con(a)}, where ‘Con’ is Go 
rmula, is relatively interpretable in T for every theorem Q in T. 
consequence of Gijdel’s Second Theorem that every reflexive 
finitely axiomatizable a 
has an independent r .e. 
4] showed that the following systems are re 
of reals, 2F set theory and every exten 
axiomatization of 
extension of a recwsive &ssicul theory and A is 
of the theory, then A has an independent 
Cn(B) G en(A) and A be not finitely axiomatiz- 
generate ao, al, . . . (elements of A) and test 
(B) for a given o E h(A). Since Cn( 
atizable on the ground of B, we can find a 
ence a #a,. Thus, A can be constructively shown 
is still open whether all recursive theories (and hence all possible 
f Iiecursive theories) are independently r.e. axiomatizable in classical 
or&k logic, we get: 
{+, A, v, I} has an independent r.e. 
nd logic if its theory Cn(A) (z-n the 
t of this logic) is recursive. 
that A is not fmitely axiomatizable and A )_a. Generate 
Since i- is recursive and 
argulrnent would be ed, see Theorem 4.4. 
t f(a) be the strongest con 
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b l-f (a) and hence, by mma 2.19, we get: 
(0 0, f (4-c kf (4, 
(ii) b I- c; for some formula c in CIS(a --, a,). 
get f(a) )_ a,, as a, belongs to CIS(a-+ a,) and f(a) is the strongest 
consequence of A among the formulae in CIS(a-+ a,,). Then, by a similar 
argument, we also to CIS(a --) a,) 
consequence of A. ich gives a l-a,. 
impossible as it has umed that a #a,. Thus, our assumption that a + f (a) 
is not Gninimal in Cn(A) gets us a contradiction which means, according to 
Theorem 4.4, that A is independently r.2. axiomatizable. 0 
It will be further shown, see Proposition 4.12, that there are r.e. (but not 
recursive) theories in intuitionistic propositional ogic which are not independ- 
ently r.e. axiomatizable-cf. 
Hypersimple set3 
The notion of hypersimple was introduced by Post who defined various classes 
of sets (e.g. simple sets, creative sets etc.) in order to find a set whose degree of 
unsolvability was strictly between the degree of recursive and complete sets. 
Astonishingly, by use of hypersimple sets it is possible to get r.e. sets which have 
no independent r.e. axiomatizations in classical predicate logic and r.e. sets which 
have no independent r.e. axiomatizations in the intuitionistic propositional logic 
{+, A, v, I}-we discuss these questions below. The equivalence between 
hypersimplicity and non-independent axiomatizations provides a general setting 
for these (negative) results. 
A set r” of natural numbers is hypersimple if it is r.e., its complement is infinite 
and there is no array of disjoint sets such that each member of this array contains 
an element from the complement of I. y an array we mean a recursively 
enumerated sequence 4, &, . . . of finite sets (of numbers) given by their 
canonical indices-it means that I, are effectively given for each it. Post proved 
that hypersimple sets exist. 
. The following are equivalent if A and k are r.e. : 
(i) A has an independent r.e. axiomatization. 
(ii) The set I = {i: a0 A l l l A aj-1 +ai is not U-minimal in &(A)) is not 
hypersimple for every r.e. axiomatization aO, a1, a2, . . . of A. 
(iii) The set I = {i: a0 A l 9 l A ai-1 +cLi is not Gminimal in Cn(A)) k~ not 
hypersimple for some r.e. axiomatization aO, a1, a2, . . . of A. 
ise, iS 
a number f(0) such that 
a number ~(0) such that 
b 0, l l l , bdoj I- ai for each i +(O). 
procedure b g(o)+l instead of bO. Since k is r.e. we 
recursive mappings f and g such that: 
l l l P qf(lt,~ bg(n-1)+1- 
0 A , . . . , bdm,@ for each i of. 
tusdeGne~={O,...J(O)}andZ~+,= {i: f(n) < i “f(n + 1)). It is obvious 
that the sets &, Z1, Zz, . . . are disjoint and finite Thus, we get an infinite array of 
disjoint sets. S that Zm is contai.rA in I for some PL Then none of the 
sentences 
). Thus, we get Ci E (h(A) such that 
ci4aon~*.hai_1+ai foreachkZ=. 
bviously, if we A {Ci: i E a}, we get c E Cn(A) and, by 
Ca4ZoAg--Aai_1+ai foreachiel,. 
rice, by the definition of I, and Lemma 2.6, one gets 
C CJ I\ (ai: i Sf(R# - 1)) --3 A {ai: i Sf(R)}. 
one gets C Q A (t&Z i Sf (0)). ver, by (1) and (2), we have 
A (ai: i s f (n - 1)) + A {ai: i S f (n)} )_ bo A l l l A bg(n-l)+ bg(n-l)+l 
nc,, by Lemma 2.4(iii), the sentence 
lj+l (or b,) is not Cl-minimal in Q(A). This, however, 
us our a!Ssu t is contained in I gets us a 
don; each member of the contains an element from 
atization for A sue 
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disjoint sets such t e array contains an element from 
complement of I. eorem 4.4, we need to define a recursive 
mapping f such that a+(a) is not Gninimal in Cn(A) for any a E Cn(A). 
§uppose that a E generate sequents for I- and Ford a number k such 
that ao,. . . , akl-a. n we find I, disjoint with (0, . . . , k} (we recall that the 
sets &II,..* are disjoint and effectively given). Let f(a) = A {as: s E 1.). 
prove that a+ f (a) is Gminimal in Cn(A). 
According to our assumptions there is a ber i EI,, such that i $ I. Thus, 
aoh . . . Aai-1 -)ai is Cl-minimal in Cn(A). reover, i > k as I, is disjoint with 
10 S...P k} and hence a0 A l l = A ai- t-a. Then we get 
Q~f(Q))_UoA~ogAa~-l~Ui 
which shows that a --) f (a) is &ninimal in Cn(A) as otherwise the sentence 
+:, A l l l A ai_l+ai would not be a-minimal there, see Lemma 2.4(iii). Cl 
have I={i:baaoA...Aa i-1’ ai for some b E en(A)} or equivalently 
I = (i :ao, . . . , &Q-l, ai+ b t- ai for some b E en(A)}. Since a collapses in classi- 
cal logic (see Example 2.7) and all non-valid sentences are Gninimal in the 
classical case, we get the following relation, proved by Pour-El [16], between the 
notion of hypersimple and independent r.e. axiomatization i classical logic. 
. The following are equivalent in classical logic for any ;*.e. set A: 
(i) A has an independent r.e. axiomatization. 
(ii) The set {i :a0 A l l l A ai- l- ai) is not hypersimple for every r.e. axiomatiza- 
tion ao, al, a2,. . . ofA. 
(iii) Theset (i:ao A 9 l l A ai- I- ai) is not hypersimple for some r.e. ~iOmt&a- 
. 
tron ao, al, a2, . . . ofA. 
Thus, Theorem 4.9 may be seen as an extension, to the intuitionistic ase, of 
the above result by Pour-El; our proof of 4.9 is, in fact, very similaz to the 
argument given by Pour-El. Although not identical, Theorem 4.9 is closely 
related to a lemma in 
Negative results 
y use of hypersimple sets it is possible to prove the following result of 
[IO1 . . 
e There is an r.e. set of predicate sesatencea w 
independent r.e. axiomatization in classical predicate logic. 
P. wojtylfzk 
;x, y)-+ P(x)], P(Z), P(3), P(Q), l l l 
axiomatic extension of Q. By Theorem 
(x, r)+ P(x)], P(2), l l l ? P(n-l))_P(n) iff nEI. 
n (e) is obvious as 3y K(x, y) represents the set I in Q and 
,y)ifnEZwhichgives 
(n) for every n E I. 
on (3) let us assume that n $ I. Since the predicate letter 
we can interpret P as a unary predicate on the set of 
numbers such that P(m) holds for all m #n and P(n) does not hold. 
(m), for every m, are valid (we use here *the fact that n $ I) but 
isel also remarks in [IO] that the theory considered above would become 
r.e. axiomatizable if 3y K(x, y) represented a simple, non- 
The above result by s that remark clear. Pour-El 
a more general result: axiomatizable and effectively 
arable classical theory (i.e. a theory where the set of theorems and that of 
are an effectively inseparable pair of sets, e.g. Q) has an 
extension which is not independently r.e. axiomatizable. Furthermore, the 
extension contains the same non-logical constants as the initial theory (in the case 
ay be included in PA). 
holds for intuitionistic t oreover, in the intuitionistic case, 
ve a stronger result, see [21], on the existence of r.e. sets 
have no independent r.e. axiomatization in the propositional fragment of 
. There are r.e. sets in {+, A, v, .L ) which have no independent 
tizations in intuitioniktic logic. 
heory than only the 
amely, we use here 
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t f be an one-to-one enumeration of an r.e., but not recursive, set. It means 
f is a generally recursive and one-to-one mapping such that the set 
{fu%fw~fm ’ l 4 is r.e., but is not recursive. A natural number IZ is said to 
be f-minimal if f (m) > f (n) for every on 3 
Let us prove that the set I of numbers are not f-minimal is hypersimple, 
i.e. let us prove that the following set is 
I = {n: f (m) C f (n) for some 112 >n}. 
(1) The set I is r.e. Indeed, we generate the numbers f (n + l), f (n + 2), . . . 
and test whether f (n + k) <f(n). If n belongs to I, we will find a number k such 
that f (n + k) <f(n). Thus, we can generate all elem;;nts of 1. 
(2) Suppose, on the contrary, that the set off-minima\ numbers is bounded by 
no. Then, each n 3 no is not f-minimal and we get, therefore, a number nl > no 
such that f(ni) <f(no). But n1 is not f-minimal, either, as nl ano and hence 
f (Paz) <f (nl) for some n2 > nl. Repeating the above procedure, we would get a 
descending sequence f (no) > f (nl) >f(n2) > l l l of natural numbers which, of 
course, is impossible. 
(3) Let &, It, 12, l - l be an infinite array of disjoint sets such that each member 
of the array contains an f-minimal number. Suppose that i,, is f-minimal and 
i, E I’, and let g(n) = min{f(i): i E In}. It is obvious that f(i,J a&n). Given a 
number n, one can find a number m > n such that j > i for each j E I’ and each 
i E In (as the sets IO, II, 12, . . . are finite and disjoint). Then f(in) <f(j) for every 
j E I’ as i, is f -minimal and hence 
g(n) S f (in) < min( f (i): j E Im} = g(m). 
It means that the mapping  is not bounded. Since g is recursive, given a number 
k, one can find a number n such that k <g(n). Thus, k <f (in) and hence 
k <f(m) for each m > i, as in is f-minimal. Now, we can easily decide whether 
the given number k is or is not in (f (0), f (I), f (2), . . .}. It suffices to test 
whether or not k belongs to (f (0), . . . , f (max(m})} as k <f(m) for each m > i, 
and max{l,} 2 in. We would get, therefore, a recursive method of deciding 
whether a given number belongs to (f (0), f(l), f (2), . . . } or not. This, however, 
contradicts our assumptions. 
t has been proved above that the set I is hypersimple. Now, let us define an 
r.e. set A = (ao, ul, a2, . . . ) in {-+, A, v , I} which has no independent axioma- 
tization in intuitionistic logic. Let Pn, for n C o, be propositional variables and 
let P) be formulae giving rise to the ishimura lattice (see 
Exa e 2.8). take h(n) = 4f (n) + 4 and 
% = Qhcn)(po) A l l l A Qh(n)(Pn)* 
Let us observe that p I- &(&?) as h(n) 3 
P. wojrylok 
-am is valid. To complete our argument it sufkes to prove, cf. 
at 
Z=(n:ao~...ha,_l~a,is~ot GminimalinCn 
n n is not f-minimal and hence f(n) >f(m) for some m > pt. 
4, we get (see &ample 2-S) QI,&P) 4 Qt&p). But 
(m,(pJ for i = 0, 1, . . . , m and hence, by Lemma 2.4(ii), 
a, a Qhe,(pj) for i = 0, 1, l l l , m 
and conclude, using n < mma 2.6, that a, 4 a,. Since 
a 2.4@)) a, U a0 A l l l A an_l+a, which shows that 
is not Gninimal in Cn(A). 
en n is fminimal and hence f(n) <f(m) for every m > n. 
have, therefore, cr, k Qua,,&+) for i = 0, . . . , n which gives, in turn, 
a,% for every m > n, 
ere a: results from a, by replacing the variables pi, with i > II, by pn. Suppose 
l l l A a,,_l+am is Got Gninimai in Cn(A). Hence 
ao, . . . . a n-1, a,,+b b, for some b E Cn(A). 
have 00, . . . , akkbforsomekandwecanassumethatk>n. Then 
a0 s=-=? a n-19 an-an+1 A l l l Aa&a, 
and replacing the variables pi, with i > n, by pn we get 
ao,...,a~-,,an-jQn+rrn=-=hak*~an 
ch means that aoA===Aa,-l 3 a, is valid as a, k at for every m > n. Thus, 
we get a contradiction and this shows that a0 A l - l A an++ a, is d-minimal in 
Cn(A) ifn$Z. c7 
argument is not the same as the one used by Reznikoff, but it uses a 
e same result as above can be shown for any intermediate logic in 
hich the formulas Q,, are not valid. Actually, it sufkes to have an in&rite 
ain of formulas 4 to get an r.e. theory which is not 
y r.e. axiomatizable. recall that all countable sets are independ- 
ble if there is no g chain of formulas for G-see 
. 
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